One shared core, many wrappers
Why the post-quantum transition is fragmenting, and how it is governed all the same.
One set of algorithms now sits underneath almost every national plan for post-quantum cryptography. When a United States federal agency published three standards in August 2024, a contested question became a settled technical fact, and within months those choices were in European certification catalogues, in national guidance from Paris to Bonn, and in the browsers shipping to the world. The core is shared. What surrounds it is not.
The wrappers: an instrument cascade
The same algorithms arrive wrapped in very different instruments. In the European Union they are becoming binding through NIS2 and DORA and, from December 2027, the Cyber Resilience Act, though rarely by name. The obligation is carried by an undefined phrase, state of the art, whose cryptographic content is supplied by an interpretive layer of certification guidance that sits between legislation and practice. Elsewhere the same core is wrapped in soft national roadmaps, and across much of the world in nothing at all.
The clocks diverge, against an uncertain threat
The timetables fragment as sharply as the instruments, and every one of them is set against a threat that cannot be dated. Germany's BSI, in its technical guideline, sets 2030 for highly sensitive applications, 2031 for classical asymmetric encryption used on its own and 2035 for classical signatures. The EU coordinated roadmap, a recommendation to Member States, sets 2030 for high-risk use cases and 2035 for medium-risk ones. A United States executive order of June 2026 sets 2030 and 2031 for federal high value assets and high-impact systems, and national security systems are to complete their move to CNSA 2.0 by 2035. India's Department of Science and Technology names 2029 for critical information infrastructure and 2033 for enterprise-wide adoption. Thailand's cyber agency runs a phased roadmap that moves high-priority systems by 2028 and completes in 2035. The Atlas records no national migration date for China.
What each clock races is not an observed danger but an expectation. Climate governance can point to rising temperatures; quantum-safe governance has no such observable, only the qubit counts the industry says it will reach and an uncertain threshold at which they break today's encryption. The gap between the two is the whole risk, and no calendar settles it: a 2025 estimate (Gidney) puts a machine able to break RSA-2048 at under a million noisy qubits, while the largest target any roadmap in the chart below states is 100,000 connected qubits by 2033. The dates do their work anyway, because expectations are performative: they cascade vertically, a revised hardware estimate registering at once in Washington's gates and Brussels' targets, and they align horizontally, as when four national agencies co-signed a single position in January 2024 that confined quantum key distribution to niche uses and named post-quantum migration the priority. Each national clock is, in the end, a wager that migration will finish before the machine arrives.
- Kind of date, the shape of a mark:
-
- Plan
- Priority systems
- Completion
- Kind not recorded
- Coordination posture, the dot beside a name:
-
- EU coordinated
- NIST bloc
- Sovereign
Show as a table
| Place | Coordination posture | Date | What the record says | Kind of date | How it is set | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | EU coordinated | 2026 | Federal Government goal to initiate migration in security-critical areas | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | Germany profile |
| Germany | EU coordinated | 2030 | Highly sensitive applications: classical asymmetric encryption no longer used on its own; high-security applications migrated | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | Germany profile |
| Germany | EU coordinated | 2031 | Classical asymmetric encryption no longer used on its own | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | Germany profile |
| Germany | EU coordinated | 2035 | Classical signatures phased out | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | Germany profile |
| European Union | EU coordinated | December 2026 | The First Steps and the start of planning and pilots for high- and medium-risk use cases | Plan | Set in guidance (soft law) | NIS Cooperation Group, EU roadmap |
| European Union | EU coordinated | December 2030 | Moving high-risk use cases, with quantum-safe software and firmware upgrades on by default | Priority systems | Set in guidance (soft law) | NIS Cooperation Group, EU roadmap |
| European Union | EU coordinated | December 2035 | Moving medium-risk use cases, and as many low-risk ones as feasible | Completion | Set in guidance (soft law) | NIS Cooperation Group, EU roadmap |
| United States | NIST bloc | 2025 | Federal agencies take preparatory post-quantum transition actions (Executive Order 14144) | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | United States profile |
| United States | NIST bloc | 2030 | Federal High Value Assets and high-impact systems migrate key establishment to the NIST post-quantum standards | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | United States profile |
| United States | NIST bloc | 2031 | Federal High Value Assets and high-impact systems migrate digital signatures to the NIST post-quantum standards | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | United States profile |
| United States | NIST bloc | 2035 | National Security Systems complete migration to CNSA 2.0 | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | United States profile |
| India | NIST bloc | 2029 | Quantum resiliency of critical information infrastructure (DST Quantum-Safe Ecosystem report) | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | India profile |
| India | NIST bloc | 2033 | Enterprise-wide post-quantum cryptography adoption (DST Quantum-Safe Ecosystem report) | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | India profile |
| India | NIST bloc | 2035 | National quantum vision horizon with post-quantum cryptography transition plan for government systems (NITI Aayog roadmap) | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | India profile |
| Thailand | NIST bloc | 2026 | Survey and risk assessment of the cryptographic estate | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | Thailand profile |
| Thailand | NIST bloc | 2027 | Initial transition planning | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | Thailand profile |
| Thailand | NIST bloc | 2028 | Migration of high-priority systems | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | Thailand profile |
| Thailand | NIST bloc | 2030 | Plan refinement and review | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | Thailand profile |
| Thailand | NIST bloc | 2035 | National transition to quantum-resistant cryptography complete | Kind not recorded | Bindingness not recorded | Thailand profile |
The failure mode is congestion, not absence
A network of expectations can fail, and its failure mode is congestion rather than a missing authority. The financial sector already faces DORA, national supervisors, G7 guidance and sectoral roadmaps at once, and the result is deferral: ENISA finds only a small share of European stakeholders have begun to migrate. The answer is not necessarily a central authority. It is to make the state of the transition common knowledge, who stands where, on which instrument, to what clock.
One shared core, many wrappers, held loosely together by a network of expectations. The Atlas maps the wrappers, country by country, so the fragmentation can at least be read.
Every migration date on this page follows the Atlas's own records, each drawn by its kind of date and by how it is set. An earlier version drew some of them as hard deadlines and gave years the records do not hold.
Sources
- NIST, FIPS 203, 204 and 205: post-quantum cryptography standards (August 2024).
- European Union: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2); Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA); Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), most of which applies from 11 December 2027.
- ENISA, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity: cryptographic certification (EUCC) and post-quantum readiness surveys (with ISACA).
- NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (2025), a recommendation to Member States setting targets for the end of 2026, 2030 and 2035.
- BSI (Germany): technical guideline TR-02102 and its recommendations on the migration to post-quantum cryptography.
- United States: Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks (22 June 2026), setting 2030 and 2031 for federal high value assets and high-impact systems; NSA Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 (CNSA 2.0), with migration of national security systems targeted by 2035; Executive Order 14306 (2025), amending Executive Order 14144.
- India: Department of Science and Technology, Implementation of Quantum Safe Ecosystem in India, Report of the Task Force (2026), and Report on Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India, naming 2029 for critical information infrastructure and 2033 for enterprise-wide adoption; NITI Aayog, Roadmap for Transforming India into a Leading Quantum-Powered Economy, with a 2035 horizon.
- Thailand: NCSA QUANTA post-quantum readiness platform (pqc-learn.ncsa.or.th), a phased roadmap recommending the NIST standards, with high-priority systems migrated by 2028 and national completion by 2035.
- China: OSCCA SM-series national cryptographic algorithms.
- Industry qubit figures and targets: IBM (Condor, 1,121 qubits, 2023; a goal of 100,000 connected qubits by 2033); Microsoft (Majorana 1, eight topological qubits, 2025); Amazon (Ocelot, five data qubits and four ancilla qubits, 2025).
- Qubits needed to break RSA-2048: Gidney, C., and Ekerå, M. (2019), 20 million noisy qubits; Gidney, C. (2025), under a million noisy qubits.
- ANSSI, BSI, the Netherlands NLNCSA and the Swedish National Communications Security Authority: joint position paper on quantum key distribution (January 2024), prioritising post-quantum migration.
- Global Risk Institute and evolutionQ: Quantum Threat Timeline Report (2024), and Mosca's risk inequality (x + y > z).
- G7 Cyber Expert Group: statement on the risks of quantum computing to the financial sector (September 2024).
- Bradford, A. (2020). The Brussels Effect. Oxford University Press.
- Budde, B., and Konrad, K. (2019). Tentative governing of fuel cell innovation in a dynamic network of expectations. Research Policy, 48(5).
- CEPS: Pupillo, L., et al. (2025). Strengthening the EU Transition to a Quantum-Safe World, Task Force report.
The Atlas's data and code are public on GitHub and archived on Zenodo (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21262284). The profiles behind the chart: Germany, European Union, United States, India, Thailand.
A commentary from the QSC Atlas, drawing on the CEPS Task Force on Strengthening the EU Transition to a Quantum-Safe World (2025).