One shared core, many wrappers

Why the post-quantum transition is fragmenting, and how it is governed all the same.

A commentary from the QSC Atlas. How the Atlas classifies countries

One set of algorithms now sits underneath almost every national plan for post-quantum cryptography. When a United States federal agency published three standards in August 2024, a contested question became a settled technical fact, and within months those choices were in European certification catalogues, in national guidance from Paris to Bonn, and in the browsers shipping to the world. The core is shared. What surrounds it is not.

The wrappers: an instrument cascade

The same algorithms arrive wrapped in very different instruments. In the European Union they are becoming binding through NIS2 and DORA and, from December 2027, the Cyber Resilience Act, though rarely by name. The obligation is carried by an undefined phrase, state of the art, whose cryptographic content is supplied by an interpretive layer of certification guidance that sits between legislation and practice. Elsewhere the same core is wrapped in soft national roadmaps, and across much of the world in nothing at all.

The clocks diverge, against an uncertain threat

The timetables fragment as sharply as the instruments, and every one of them is set against a threat that cannot be dated. Germany's BSI, in its technical guideline, sets 2030 for highly sensitive applications, 2031 for classical asymmetric encryption used on its own and 2035 for classical signatures. The EU coordinated roadmap, a recommendation to Member States, sets 2030 for high-risk use cases and 2035 for medium-risk ones. A United States executive order of June 2026 sets 2030 and 2031 for federal high value assets and high-impact systems, and national security systems are to complete their move to CNSA 2.0 by 2035. India's Department of Science and Technology names 2029 for critical information infrastructure and 2033 for enterprise-wide adoption. Thailand's cyber agency runs a phased roadmap that moves high-priority systems by 2028 and completes in 2035. The Atlas records no national migration date for China.

What each clock races is not an observed danger but an expectation. Climate governance can point to rising temperatures; quantum-safe governance has no such observable, only the qubit counts the industry says it will reach and an uncertain threshold at which they break today's encryption. The gap between the two is the whole risk, and no calendar settles it: a 2025 estimate (Gidney) puts a machine able to break RSA-2048 at under a million noisy qubits, while the largest target any roadmap in the chart below states is 100,000 connected qubits by 2033. The dates do their work anyway, because expectations are performative: they cascade vertically, a revised hardware estimate registering at once in Washington's gates and Brussels' targets, and they align horizontally, as when four national agencies co-signed a single position in January 2024 that confined quantum key distribution to niche uses and named post-quantum migration the priority. Each national clock is, in the end, a wager that migration will finish before the machine arrives.

The quantum-safe race: qubit counts against the migration dates the Atlas records One 2023 to 2040 timeline. Above, qubit counts the companies have announced and IBM's stated target of 100,000 connected qubits by 2033, against a 2025 estimate that breaking RSA-2048 would take under a million noisy qubits. Below, the migration dates the Atlas records, each place with its coordination posture: Germany (EU coordinated): 2026, 2030, 2031 and 2035, bindingness not recorded. European Union (EU coordinated): 2026 (plan), 2030 (priority systems) and 2035 (completion), set in guidance (soft law). United States (NIST bloc): 2025, 2030, 2031 and 2035, bindingness not recorded. India (NIST bloc): 2029, 2033 and 2035, bindingness not recorded. Thailand (NIST bloc): 2026, 2027, 2028, 2030 and 2035, bindingness not recorded. China (Sovereign): no date recorded. 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040 The quantum clock: where industry says its qubit counts are heading 10M 1M 100k 10k 1k 100 10 Under a million noisy qubits: estimate to break RSA-2048 (Gidney, 2025) IBM Condor, 1,121 (2023) IBM target, 100,000 by 2033 Microsoft Majorana 1, 8 (2025) Amazon Ocelot, 9 (2025) The migration dates the Atlas records, by how each is set Set in guidance European Union 2026 2030 2035 Bindingness not recorded Germany 2026 2030 2031 2035 United States 2025 2030 2031 2035 India 2029 2033 2035 Thailand 2026 2027 2028 2030 2035 No date recorded China No migration date in its profile
Kind of date, the shape of a mark:
  • Plan
  • Priority systems
  • Completion
  • Kind not recorded
Coordination posture, the dot beside a name:
  • EU coordinated
  • NIST bloc
  • Sovereign
The quantum-safe race. Above, qubit counts the companies have announced and IBM's stated target, against a 2025 published estimate of what breaking RSA-2048 would take. Below, the migration dates the Atlas records for Germany, the European Union, the United States, India and Thailand, grouped by whether the Atlas records them as set in law or set in guidance, or has not recorded their bindingness; the shape of each mark gives its kind of date where the Atlas has recorded it. The Atlas records no migration date for China. A target is not a legal deadline unless a binding instrument sets it. How the Atlas labels dates.
Show as a table
The migration dates in the chart, by place
PlaceCoordination postureDateWhat the record saysKind of dateHow it is setRecord
GermanyEU coordinated2026Federal Government goal to initiate migration in security-critical areasKind not recordedBindingness not recordedGermany profile
GermanyEU coordinated2030Highly sensitive applications: classical asymmetric encryption no longer used on its own; high-security applications migratedKind not recordedBindingness not recordedGermany profile
GermanyEU coordinated2031Classical asymmetric encryption no longer used on its ownKind not recordedBindingness not recordedGermany profile
GermanyEU coordinated2035Classical signatures phased outKind not recordedBindingness not recordedGermany profile
European UnionEU coordinatedDecember 2026The First Steps and the start of planning and pilots for high- and medium-risk use casesPlanSet in guidance (soft law)NIS Cooperation Group, EU roadmap
European UnionEU coordinatedDecember 2030Moving high-risk use cases, with quantum-safe software and firmware upgrades on by defaultPriority systemsSet in guidance (soft law)NIS Cooperation Group, EU roadmap
European UnionEU coordinatedDecember 2035Moving medium-risk use cases, and as many low-risk ones as feasibleCompletionSet in guidance (soft law)NIS Cooperation Group, EU roadmap
United StatesNIST bloc2025Federal agencies take preparatory post-quantum transition actions (Executive Order 14144)Kind not recordedBindingness not recordedUnited States profile
United StatesNIST bloc2030Federal High Value Assets and high-impact systems migrate key establishment to the NIST post-quantum standardsKind not recordedBindingness not recordedUnited States profile
United StatesNIST bloc2031Federal High Value Assets and high-impact systems migrate digital signatures to the NIST post-quantum standardsKind not recordedBindingness not recordedUnited States profile
United StatesNIST bloc2035National Security Systems complete migration to CNSA 2.0Kind not recordedBindingness not recordedUnited States profile
IndiaNIST bloc2029Quantum resiliency of critical information infrastructure (DST Quantum-Safe Ecosystem report)Kind not recordedBindingness not recordedIndia profile
IndiaNIST bloc2033Enterprise-wide post-quantum cryptography adoption (DST Quantum-Safe Ecosystem report)Kind not recordedBindingness not recordedIndia profile
IndiaNIST bloc2035National quantum vision horizon with post-quantum cryptography transition plan for government systems (NITI Aayog roadmap)Kind not recordedBindingness not recordedIndia profile
ThailandNIST bloc2026Survey and risk assessment of the cryptographic estateKind not recordedBindingness not recordedThailand profile
ThailandNIST bloc2027Initial transition planningKind not recordedBindingness not recordedThailand profile
ThailandNIST bloc2028Migration of high-priority systemsKind not recordedBindingness not recordedThailand profile
ThailandNIST bloc2030Plan refinement and reviewKind not recordedBindingness not recordedThailand profile
ThailandNIST bloc2035National transition to quantum-resistant cryptography completeKind not recordedBindingness not recordedThailand profile

The failure mode is congestion, not absence

A network of expectations can fail, and its failure mode is congestion rather than a missing authority. The financial sector already faces DORA, national supervisors, G7 guidance and sectoral roadmaps at once, and the result is deferral: ENISA finds only a small share of European stakeholders have begun to migrate. The answer is not necessarily a central authority. It is to make the state of the transition common knowledge, who stands where, on which instrument, to what clock.

One shared core, many wrappers, held loosely together by a network of expectations. The Atlas maps the wrappers, country by country, so the fragmentation can at least be read.

Every migration date on this page follows the Atlas's own records, each drawn by its kind of date and by how it is set. An earlier version drew some of them as hard deadlines and gave years the records do not hold.

Sources

The Atlas's data and code are public on GitHub and archived on Zenodo (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21262284). The profiles behind the chart: Germany, European Union, United States, India, Thailand.

A commentary from the QSC Atlas, drawing on the CEPS Task Force on Strengthening the EU Transition to a Quantum-Safe World (2025).